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EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT INDETERMINISM 
REASONING ABOUT UNCERTAIN  AND CONTRADICTORY 
SPECIF ICAT IONS OF  DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 
SVEN-ERIK BORNSCHEUER AND MICHAEL THIELSCHER 
I> A high-level action semantics for specifying and reasoning about dynamic 
systems is presented which supports both uncertain knowledge (taken as 
explicit indeterminism) and contradictory information (taken as implicit 
indeterminism). We start by developing an action description language for 
intentionally representing nondeterministic actions in dynamic systems. 
We then study the different possibilities of interpreting contradictory 
specifications of concurrent actions. We argue that the most reasonable 
interpretation which allows for exploiting as much information as possible, 
is to take such conflicts as implicit indeterminism. As the second major 
contribution, we present a calculus for our resulting action semantics 
based on the logic programming paradigm including negation-as-failure 
and equational theories. Soundness and completeness of this encoding 
wrt. the notion of entailment in our action language is proved by taking 
the completion semantics for equational logic programs with negation. 
© Elsevier Science Inc., 1997 < 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty is a general challenge which comes with different faces. If an agent 
reasons about a given representation of a dynamic system, he or she might be 
uncertain about the effects of particular actions; one possible reason for such an 
uncertainty is the designer of this representation has intentionally specified these 
actions so as to having nondeterministic effects. There are good reasons for doing 
this: The designer might not know the exact causal relationship between the ac- 
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tion and the observed effects, or the action might be chaotic, etc. In the very first 
part of this paper, we develop a high-level representation language and semantics 
which allows for intentionally specifying actions with nondeterministic, randomized 
effects. 
Our language is based on the Action Description Language ~ [12], which is 
appealing because of the simple, elegant and natural way in which the effects of 
actions are described. A formal introduction to this language can be found in 
Section 2, and our extended language dealing with explicit indeterminism, which we 
call ~¢N, is then developed in Section 3. 
Aside from being faced with explicitly represented indeterminism, a reasoning 
agent might also be uncertain about a given specification when the latter turns out 
to be contradictory. Intelligent beings are most often able to evaluate contradictory 
information to an appropriate xtent. For instance, imagine yourself asking two 
passers-by for the shortest way to the train station. The first one answers: "Turn 
right, and you will get there in five minutes," while the second one answers: "Turn 
right, and you will get there in ten minutes." Reasoning about these answers, you 
find out that they are contradictory; the provided information is inconsistent and, 
hence, cannot be true. However, since both passers-by are in agreement about 
their recommendation to turn right, you would assume this part of the information 
to be sound; you are just left with uncertainty about the time it takes to reach the 
station. 
One should be aware of the difference between uncertain information explicitly 
stated as such, like "you will arrive in five or in ten minutes," and contradictory 
information like the two answers above. Contradictory information cannot be true, 
so it has to be interpreted appropriately if nonetheless ome benefit is to be 
derived from it. Of course, any such interpretation has to be carefully selected in 
view of the application at hand. When machines are used to reason about complex 
domains, it is highly likely that an inconsistency occurs in the corresponding formal 
specification; e.g., we know from Software Engineering that in general formaliza- 
tions of non-trivial scenarios are incorrect. Therefore, if a reasoning system detects 
an inconsistency in the information that has been provided, this only confirms what 
had to be assumed anyway. But it still remains to be decided how this system 
should act in such a situation. 
A typical problem in the context of reasoning about actions where contradictory 
specifications are to be expected is the concurrent execution of actions. Most 
complex dynamic systems include some kind of concurrency, which is why the 
ability of describing simultaneous actions is of central interest in AI. For instance, 
to open a door locked by an electric door opener and autonomous robot has to 
press a button and to push the door concurrently. Thus, knowing the effects of the 
separate xecution of these actions only is not sufficient o be able to open the 
door. Since it is of course impractical to define the effects of the concurrent 
execution of each possible combination of actions explicitly, it is necessary to infer 
these effects from the various descriptions of the individual actions that are 
involved. In certain cases, some of these descriptions may however propose 
contradictory effects. The crucial question then is how to interpret such contra- 
dictions. 
This question will be discussed in Section 4. To this end, we use a recent 
extension of the Action Description Language ~¢ which is called ~'c and supports 
representing and reasoning about concurrent actions [5]. In Section 4.1, we discuss 
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different explicit methods which enable the designer of a representation to prevent 
the aforementioned conflicts by providing more specific information regarding 
particular combinations of concurrently executed actions. We will argue that ~¢c 
uses the most expressive way and, hence, is most suitable as a basis for our further 
discussions. The language ~¢c is recapitulated in Section 4.2. 
In Section 4.3, we then examine the various possibilities to interpret contradic- 
tory inferences caused by combining action descriptions. Suggesting a different 
point of view than the one implicitly underlying ~¢c, we present a new language 
called ~NCC" Thereby we combine our aforementioned development regarding 
explicit indeterminism, the language ~'N, with ~¢c, and we define a new way of 
successfully reasoning about inconsistent specifications of concurrently, executed 
actions. 1The crucial idea is to interpret any such contradiction as implicit indeter- 
minism. To this end, we consider uncertain the pieces of information which cause 
the contradiction, while all effects on which the involved action descriptions agree 
are assumed to occur as specified. In so doing, our language nables us to still infer 
reasonable information from contradictory descriptions, whereas these inferences 
are neither possible in J nor in ~c. 
As the second major contribution of this paper, in Section 5 we present a sound 
and complete translation from domains pecified in our high-level action language 
~¢NCC into logic programs. Our translation follows an approach originally intro- 
duced in [17], which is based on the reification of entire state descriptions by 
formally treating them as terms. In contrast o situation calculus [28, 30], where 
situation terms are abstract objects, the former approach employs state terms 
consisting of an explicit collection of those fluents which hold in the situation being 
represented. Executing actions is then modeled by manipulating these collections 
of fluents, which is why we call the underlying method fluent calculus (or ~-~, for 
short). 2 An equational ogic program suitable for encoding ~NCC, consequently 
named o~-~NC c, is developed in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we analyze the 
semantics of this program given by its completion, and in Section 5.3 we prove 
soundness and completeness wrt. the high-level action semantics given by ~scc.  
Finally, in Section 5.4 we discuss an adequate computation mechanism for our 
program, namely, SLDENF-resolution [34, 39], which is based on SLD-resolution 
but with the standard unification procedure replaced by a special equality unifica- 
tion algorithm (E) and negation-as-failure used to treat negative subgoals (NF). 
2. DESCRIBING SIMPLE ACTION SCENARIOS 
To begin with, we briefly review the concepts underlying the Action Description 
language ~ as defined in [12]. 
Definition 2.1. A domain description D consists of two disjoint and nonempty sets 
of symbols F o and A o called fluent names and unit actions, respectively. A 
fluent literal is a fluent name or its negation, the latter of which is denoted by f. 
l~a¢ N denotes an "action formalism supporting nondeterministic (N) actions based on the Action 
Description Language (~¢')," and SgNC c is as ~¢N but in addition supports concurrent actions (C) and 
conflict solving (C). 
2 We are grateful to Stuart Russell for suggesting this name. 
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Furthermore,  D consists of a set V D of value propositions (v-propositions, for 
short), which are expressions of the form 
l a f te r  [a  I . . . . .  am], (2.1) 
where a I . . . . .  a m (m >_ 0) are unit actions and l is a fluent literal. 
Finally, D includes a set E D of effect propositions (e-propositions, for short), 
which are expressions of the form 
a causes  l i f  Cl , . . . ,Cn ,  (2.2) 
where a is a unit action and l as well as c 1 . . . .  , c n (n >_ 0) are fluent literals. 
A v-proposit ion (2.1) should be read as: If  the sequence of unit actions 
[a 1 . . . .  , a m] were per formed in the initial state then l would hold in the resulting 
state. In case m = 0, (2.1) is usually written in i t ia l l y  l. An e-proposit ion (2.2) 
should be read as: Executing unit action a causes l to hold in the resulting state 
provided the conditions c 1 . . . . .  c n hold in the current state. In case n = 0, (2.2) is 
usually written a causes  I. 
Example 2.1. We model the Yale Shooting domain [15] using the fluent names 
FD, = {loaded, alive} denoting the state of a gun and a turkey, respectively. The 
effects of the unit actions Ao, = {load, wait, shoot} are specified by these three 
e-propositions: 
load causes  loaded 
shoot causes  loaded 
shoot causes  alive i f  loaded. 
(2.3) 
In words, loading the gun causes it to be loaded, shooting with the gun causes it to 
become unloaded and also shoots the turkey provided the gun was loaded. Waiting 
is assumed to have no effects at all. On this basis, the following two v-proposit ions 
encode the Stanford Murder Mystery instance [3] of the Yale Shooting domain: 
ini t ial ly alive 
alive af ter  [wait, shoot]. 
(2.4) 
In words, the turkey is alive at the beginning but not after executing wait followed 
by shoot. 
Given a domain description D, a state o" is simply a subset of the set of fluent 
names F o. For  any f ~ Fo, if f e ~r then f is said to hold in o-, otherwise f holds. 
E.g., both alive and loaded hold in the state o-= {alive}. 
The given effect proposit ions implicitly determine the causal behavior of the 
dynamic system being modeled: 
Definition 2.2. Let D be a domain description in .~'. Furthermore,  let a ~A o be a 
unit action, l eF  o u { f J feF  o} a fluent literal, and o -oF  o a state. Then we say 
that a causes l in cr iff E D contains an e-proposit ion a causes  l i f  c I . . . . .  c,  
EXPLIC IT  AND IMPL IC IT  INDETERMINISM 123 
such that each of Cl , . . . ,c  n holds in tr. I~t  
Br(a ,  tr) := {f~FDla  causes f in or} 
B- -~a,o ' ) :={f~Fo lacauses  f in  tr} 
(2.5) 
and let do be a mapping from pairs consisting of a unit action and a state into 
the set of states, that is, dO : A × 2 Fo ~ 2 Fo. Then do is a transition function for D 
iff, for each a ~ A and o- _c FD, 
1. By(a,  t r )ABf (a ,  t r )={} and 
2. do(a, tr) = (o ' \B f (a ,  o')) UBf (a ,  o-). 
In words, Bf(a, or) contains all fluent names__ that some e-proposition claims to 
become true when executing a in o-, while Bf(a, tr) contains all fluent names that 
become false. Apart from considering new truth values for these affected fluent 
names, the general assumption of persistence is applied to all remaining fluents. In 
case Bf(a, tr) and Bf(a, tr) share one or more elements, no transition function 
exists and the entire domain is considered inconsistent. 
Example 2.1 (continued). Given the e-propositions in (2.3), we have, for instance, 
Bf(load, {alive}) = {loaded} and Bf(load, {alive}) = { }, hence do(load, {alive}) = 
{alive, loaded}. The following definition provides a complete description of the 
transition function do for the Yale Shooting scenario following Definition 2.2: 
do(wait, ~r ) = ~r 
do(load, ~r ) = ~r U {loaded} (2.6) 
f ~r\ { loaded, alive}, if loaded ~ ~r do ( shoot, ) O" 
~ or, otherwise. 
Based on the concept of transition, the semantics for ~ provides a notion of 
entailment given a domain specification: 
Definition 2.3. Let D be a domain description in z~'. A structure M is a pair (o-0, do) 
where ~r 0 _CFD--called the initial state- -and o: A x 2 ro ~ 2 Fo. Let M [~, ..... am] 
be an abbreviation for do(am, do(am_ 1 . . . . .  do(a, o'0)... )), then a v-proposition f 
a f te r  [a l , . . . ,am] is true in structure M iff f holds in the state M [a ........ ] 
A structure M=(o-0,do) is then called a model of D iff do is a transition 
function for D and every v-proposition in V D is true in M. A v-proposition v is 
entailed by D iff u is true in every model of D. 
Example 2.1 (continued). Let do be as in (2.6). Then both the two structures 
M 1 = ({alive}, do) and M 2 = ({alive, loaded}, do) are models of the first v-proposition 
in (2.4). Since M[ wait'sh°°t] = {alive} our second v-proposition in (2.4) is not true in 
M 1, whereas M[2 wait 'sh°°t] = {} shows that M e is a model for our entire example 
domain. As a matter of fact, M e is the only model. Therefore, since M~ 1 = 
{alive, loaded}, our domain description entails, among others, the v-proposition 
±n± t 5_al ly loaded. The latter can be taken as a solution to the Stanford Murder 
Mystery. 
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3. NONDETERMINISTIC ACTIONS: THE LANGUAGE -~'N 
A basic assumption underlying ~'  is that the effects of an action are always 
completely known and deterministic. As argued in the introduction, however, one 
cannot adhere to this idealistic view of the real world in general since it is 
impossible to refine descriptions of the world until the effects of an arbitrary action 
can always be fully determined. The ability of humans to handle uncertainty, 
indeterminism, or surprising effects, etc. very flexibly contrasts with the necessity of 
completely determining the effects of actions. This insight has recently led to 
several proposals for integrating nondeterministic a tions into existing frameworks, 
e.g. [7, 33, 23, 21, 4, 26]. In this section we extend the action description language ~¢ 
so that indeterminism can be explicitly represented; we denote the resulting dialect 
by ~¢N. 
To begin with, expressing nondeterministic actions requires an extended notion 
of effect propositions: 
Definition 3.1. Let F D be a set of fluents and A D a set of unit actions. An effect 
proposition is either of the form 
a causese  J-fCl,...,C n 
(in what follows called strict e-proposition), or of the form 
a alternatively causes e I ..... e m if c I ..... c n (3.1) 
(in what follows called alternative -proposition), where a ~A o and e, e t . . . . .  e m 
as well as c 1 . . . . .  c n are fluent literals (m, n > 0). 
Example 3.1. We marginally extend the Russian Turkey scenario as formalized in 
[33] and take this as the running example of this section. To this end, the set of unit 
actions used in Example 2.1 is augmented by an action called spin. The intended 
meaning is that spinning causes the gun to become randomly loaded or unloaded 
regardless of its state before, and if it becomes unloaded then the person operating 
it becomes nervous. 3 The latter is represented by the additional fluent name 
nervous. The effects of the new unit action can be specified in ~¢N using these two 
alternative -propositions: 
spin alternatively causes loaded (3.2) 
spin alternatively causes loaded, nervous. 
The intended meaning of a set of alternative -proposition is as follows: If a is a 
unit action and o- a state then let 
{~ alternatively causesEl if CIz } 
alternatively causesE 2if (3.3) 
3For sake of simplicity, we assume the gun's cylinder consist of two chambers, exactly one of which 
contains abullet. Furthermore, xecuting the action load should be interpreted as manually selecting 
the chamber that is loaded. 
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be the (not necessarily finite) set of all alternative -propositions describing a such 
that CI,C 2 . . . .  simultaneously hold in o-, where each of E1,C1, E2,C 2 . . . .  is a 
finite (possibly empty) sequence of fluent literals. Now, if a is executed in o- then 
nondeterministically one E e {El, E 2 . . . .  } becomes true in the resulting state (that 
is, all fluent literals e I . . . .  , e m =E hold in this state). 4 For instance, if spin is 
executed in the state {alive, loaded} then, following (3.2), either loaded or else both 
loaded and nervous will be true afterwards. The two possible resulting states are 
therefore {alive, loaded} and {alive, nervous}. 
Recall that a set of e-propositions in the language ~ '  determines a unique 
transition function ~.  Now, however, the possibility of alternative ffects forces a 
redefinition of this notion. At first glance one might suggest for allowing the 
existence of several different transition functions, each of which models one of the 
various alternative ffects of an action. Any particular model (tr 0, qb) would then 
have to select among these possibilities. E.g., given the e-propositions (3.2), 
could be designed such that either ~(spin, o')= tr U {loaded} or ~(spin, or)= ( t r \  
{loaded}) u {nervous}, separately for each tr. However, if qb is one of these 
transition functions in a particular model then the result of spinning the gun will 
be fixed forever regarding a particular state; e.g., it would be impossible to find a 
model where in i t ia l l y  loaded, loaded af ter  [spin], and loaded af ter  
[spin, spin] are simultaneously true. This is of course unintended. 
For this reason, we adapt a standard concept for dealing with multiple possible 
successor states by dropping the idea of qb being a function and instead using the 
notion of qb as a relation between a pair of states and a unit action name such that 
(tr, a, or ' )~  ~ whenever the application of a to o- might yield o-'. The following 
formal notion of transition in ~'N reflects this intuition: 
Definition 3.2. Let D be a domain description in ~¢N and let • _c 2 F~ HA D )< 2 eo 
be a relation. Then • is a transition relation for D iff the following condition is 
satisfied for each state o -oF  D and each unit action a ~Ao:  
Let 
I I [=  {a alternatively causesE  if CeEDI  
each fluent literal in C holds in or } 
be the set of all alternative -propositions in E D with unit action name a and 
which are applicable in o-. Then, 
1. In case H2 = { }: We say that a causes a fluent literal e in or iff E o contains a 
strict e-proposition a causes  e i f  C 1 . . . . .  C n such that each of c 1 . . . . .  c n 
holds in ~r. Define 
By(a, tr) := ( f~Fo la  causes f in ty} 
B--f (a ,  ~r):= { f~ Fola causes f in tr} 
4Hence, an alternative e-proposition (3.1) with m = 0 expresses the possibility that the execution of 
a has no effects at all aside from what is suggested by all applicable strict e-propositions. 
5Otherwise no transition relation for D exists. 
126 S.-E. BORNSCHEUER AND M. THIELSCHER 
then Bf(a, or)nBf(a,  or) must be empty :  and we have (or,a, o r ' )~qb iff 
or' = ( or \ Bf( a, or)) U Bf( a, or). 
2. In case I - l~  {}: For each h=a a l ternat ive ly  causes E if C in I I~ 
we say that a causes a fluent literal e wrt. A in o" iff e occurs in E or E D 
contains a strict e-proposition a causes  e i f  c 1 . . . . .  c n such that each of 
c I . . . . .  c n holds in or. Define 
Bf(a,  A, or) := {feFDla causes f wrt. A in or} 
f ly(a,  A, o r ) :=  {f ~ FDla causes f wrt. h in o-} 
then Bf(a, A, or) n Bi(a, A, or) must be empty for each h ~ IIa~, 6 and we have 
(or,a, or') ~ qb iff there exists some h ~ Ilff such that or' = (or\Bf(a, A, or)) 
U B:(a, A, or). 
In words, a possible successor state is constructed by accounting for each strict 
e-proposition; by selecting one e-proposition A ~ H~ among the applicable alterna- 
tives; and by applying the persistence assumption to all remaining fluents. 
Example 3.1 (continued). Recall our Russian Turkey scenario. Let A~ and A 2 
denote the first and second, respectively, e-proposition in (3.2). Then we have 
Ilspin = {/~1, '~2 } for each state or. From 
B:(spin, A 1 , or ) = { loaded} 
m 
Bf(spin, al, or) = { } 
and 
Bf ( spin, h 2 , 
B/( spin, h2, 
or ) = { nervous} 
or ) = { loaded} 
it follows that (or,spin, or') ~ @ iff o-' = o'U {loaded} or or' = (or\{loaded}) U
{nervous}, for each or. The following definition provides a complete description of 
the transition relation dp for the e-propositions (2.2) and (3.2) following Definition 
3.2: 
( or, spin, or ') ~ (I) iff or' = or U {loaded} or or' = ( or \  {loaded}) u {nervous} 
( or, wait, or ') ~ • iff or' = or 
(or,load, or ' )  ~ ¢ i f f  or'  = oru {loaded} (3.4) 
~ iff or' = [or\{loaded, alive}, if loadede or (or,shoot, O "r  ) 
or, otherwise. 
Having defined the notion of transition, we now concentrate on defining the 
concept of  a model in ~gN" The purpose of models is, in general, to provide a 
possible view of the real world according to given knowledge. In .W, where no 
indeterministic and randomized effects are allowed, models differ only in their 
initial state once a transition function is fixed. Now, however, any model needs to 
6If not then, as before, no transition relation for D exists. 
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{alive} 
{alive, loaded} / J  
{alive, toadea} ~.. 
{ alive, nervous }
. {}  
, {alive, nervous} 
load spin shoot 
FIGURE 1. Two possible developments in the Russian Turkey scenario given the initial 
state {alive}. On the basis of the additional observation that the turkey is alive after loading, 
spinning and shooting, we can exclude the upper branch and, thus, safely conclude that the 
gun was unloaded after [load, spin]. 
additionally state which particular effect occurs whenever alternatives exist. An 
additional component  for each model, namely, a function q~, shall serve this 
purpose. More precisely, ~p maps action sequences [a 1 . . . . .  a n ] to states, stating that 
the actual outcome of applying [a 1 . . . . .  a n] to the initial state in the model at hand 
would be qff[a I . . . . .  an]). For instance, if the initial state is known to be {alive} and 
we are interested in the consequences of executing the sequence of unit actions 
[load, spin, shoot] then the set of  models of  this domain can be divided into two 
classes: Either the gun remains loaded after spinning, or it becomes unloaded. This 
is formally captured by requiring that each model satisfy either qff[load, spin])= 
{alive, loaded} or else ~o([ load, spin]) = {alive, nervous}. Suppose that in addition we 
observe that the turkey is as lively as before after loading, spinning, and shooting 
then no model of  the former class can explain this. Thus, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the gun was necessarily unloaded and the hunter became nervous 
after [load, spin]. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that we would be unable to 
obtain this conclusion without "recording," by using q~, the actual outcome of the 
nondeterministic action, spin. The formal definition of  models for domain descrip- 
tions in ~¢U is as follows: 
Definition 3.3. Let D be a domain description in oar u. A structure is a triple 
(~ro, qb, q~) where or o _c F9, ~ c 2 Fo X A D )< 2 Fo and ~p : A* D ~ 2 F° such that 7 
1. ~( [ ] )=o-  0 and 
2. (q~([a 1 . . . . .  an]), an + 1, q~([al , '" ,  an, an + 1 ])) E qb for each sequence of unit ac- 
tions a I . . . . .  an, an + 1 (n > 0). 
A v-proposition l a£ter  [a 1 . . . . .  a n] (n > 0) is true in a structure (o-0, ~,  q~) iff l 
holds in qff[a 1 . . . . .  an]). The structure is a model of D iff • is a transition 
relation for D and all v-propositions in V o are true. A v-proposition v is entailed 
by D iff v is true in every model of D. 
In words, the third component  of  a structure, viz. q~, both respects the transition 
relation ~ and is now used to validate the given v-propositions. We call a domain 
description in ~¢N consistent if it has a model. 
7By A~ we denote the set of all finite lists, including the empty one, whose elements are chosen 
from A o .  
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Example 3.1 (continued). A structure (o-0, (I), ¢) is a model of (2.2) and (3.2) along 
with the two v-propositions 
i n i t ia l  ly alive 
alive a f t e r [ load, spin, shoot ] (3.5) 
iff transition relation • is as in (3.4), ~ satisfies clauses 1 and 2 of Definition 3.3, 
and alive ~ tr 0 = ~([]) as well as alive ~ ~([load, spin, shoot]). Let (tr0, ~,  ~) be any 
of these models, then/-6-d-d-b-d ~ ¢([load, spin]); hence, ~ a f te r  [load, spin] is 
entailed (cf. Figure 1). 
Like ~¢, our extended language ~¢N supports reasoning about so-called counter- 
factual action sequences due to the fact that the model component ~p is defined for 
any sequence of unit actions. To illustrate this, let us consider the following 
extension of Example 3.1, motivated by a scene in a Pierre Richard movie [31]. 8 An 
additional fluent name, broken, which describes the state of a vase. Furthermore, 
the action shoot is replaced by the unit actions shoot-at-pierre and shoot-at-vase, 
respectively, along with these four e-propositions: 
shoot-at-pierre c aus e s loaded 
shoot-at-pierre causes  alive i f loaded (3.6) 
shoot-at-vase causes  loaded 
shoot-at-vase causes  broken i f loaded. 
Now, suppose given the v-propositions 
in i  t ia l  l y alive 
i n i t ia l  ly broken (3.7) 
broken af ter  [ spin, shoot-at-vase]. 
According to the e-propositions in (3.6), any model (tr 0, ~,  ~0) must satisfy loaded 
~o([spin]) since otherwise the vase could not have been destroyed. Thus, it is 
plausible to conclude that had we shot at Pierre instead then he would not have 
survived this. Definition 3.3 supports this conclusion formally: The reader is invited 
to verify that the domain consisting of e-propositions (3.2) and (3.6) plus the above 
v-propositions, (3.7), entails 
alive af ter  [spin, shoot-at-pierre]. (3.8) 
Since the two action sequences used respectively in this v-proposition and in (3.7) 
are incompatible, this example requires reasoning about counterfactuals. 
4. CONCURRENT ACTIONS AND SOLVING CONFLICTS 
Since the problems we address in this section become more apparent in the context 
of the simultaneous execution of actions, we first discuss different ways of inter- 
8The scene is as follows: Pierre Richard pretends to intend to commit suicide with, as he believes, a 
toy gun. To prove to his fellows that it was just a joke, he aims at a vase and pulls the trigger. The vase 
shatters, and Pierre faints--he obviously drew a conclusion about a counterfactual action sequence. 
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preting domain descriptions involving concurrency. To illustrate our exposition, we 
use the terms of d (and, later on, ~¢c); nevertheless, the differences we identify 
provide a classification of other languages describing concurrent actions as well. 
4.1. Explicit Information about Concurrent Execution 
Suppose a rather complex description of a part of the world has to be constructed, 
where arbitrary unit actions may be executed concurrently. Because of the combi- 
natorial explosion it is obviously impractical to describe the effects of all possible 
combinations of unit actions. It is therefore necessary to infer the effects of 
compound actions from the descriptions given separately for the various sub- 
actions involved. Combining these action descriptions may however yield a contra- 
diction among their effects. 9 In terms of the Action Description Language oa¢ this 
amounts to having UaBf(a, tr)n UaBr(a, or)= {} (cf. Definition 2.2), where Ua a 
contains all unit actions to be executed concurrently. 
There are several ways of dealing with and inferring the effects of a compound 
action from descriptions of the involved unit actions which propose contradictory 
effects. Languages describing concurrent actions can therefore be classified accord- 
ing to the explicit and implicit methods, respectively, they use to draw these 
conclusions. 
Explicit methods provide further information as to additional effects of certain 
compound actions; they are also used to state the difference between the actual 
effects of a concurrent execution of several actions and the effects of these unit 
actions when executed alone. In terms of the Action Description Language, 
additional e-propositions may 
1. add a fluent to Bf or BI: obviously, the set Bf n Bf will remain nonempty in 
case of a conflict, hence no conflicts will be solved; 
2. remove a fluent from By or Bf: this allows the removal of predicted conflicts, 
but not the introduction of effects not mentioned by the unit action descrip- 
tions (the approach in [24] uses this method by "cancelling" effects in specific 
cases); 
3. add or remove a fluent from B s or Bf: this enables one to arbitrarily modify 
Bf and Bf (used, for instance, in ~c,  our language ~¢NCC, and in State Event 
Logic [14]). 1° 
Since an extension of d to concurrent actions, called ~c,  has recently been 
introduced [5], which uses the latter, most powerful method for stating differing 
effects of actions as regards their concurrent execution, we use this approach to 
illustrate our following discussion and adopt it when extending our language ~¢N to 
concurrency. 
9This problem might of course occur even without concurrency involved, viz. if several descriptions, 
i.e., e-propositions, of the same unit action are used to infer the effects of this single action. If this 
inference yields a contradiction, the semantics of ~¢ and ~¢N, for instance, define the whole domain 
description to be inconsistent asit does not admit a proper notion of transition. 
10-  
TO be precise, neither ~t" c nor ,~¢scc allows for simply removing an element from one of these two 
sets via an additional e-proposition. Rather, new, more specific e-propositions may shift a fluent name 
from Bf to Bf or vice versa, which, however, enables one to model any effect obtained by mere removal. 
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4.2. The Language d c 
We briefly review the concepts underlying the language d c as defined in [5] by 
pointing out the corresponding extensions of d .  In either e- or v-propositions of a 
domain description, actions are now non-empty, finite subsets of the given set of 
unit actions A o, with the intended meaning that all of the elements are executed 
concurrently. These actions are also called compound actions to distinguish them 
from the unit actions. 
Example 4.1. Suppose you can open a door by running into it if at the same time 
you activate the electric door opener; otherwise, you will hurt yourself by running 
into the door. A dog sleeping beside the door will wake up when the door opener is 
activated. You can close the door by pulling it. To formalize this scenario in ~¢c, we 
take the two sets AD3 = {activate, pull, run_into} and Fo3 = {open, sleeps, hurt}. 
Suppose that the initial state be partially described by the v-proposition in i -  
t ia l l y  sleeps. The effects of the actions can be specified by these five e-proposi- 
tions: 
{activate} causes  sleeps 
{run_into} causes  hurt i f  open 
{pull} causes  open 
{activate, run_into} causes  open 
{activate, run_into} causes  hurt i f  hurt. 
(4.1) 
Informally, the last e-proposition is needed to limit the application of the second 
one; this way of restricting applicability of (less specific) e-propositions i called 
overruling an e-proposition. Let D 3 denote the domain description given by these 
propositions. 
The concept of overruling more general action descriptions by more specific 
ones is formalized by this modification of Definition 2.2:11 If a is a compound 
action, l a fluent literal and o- a state, then we say that a causes I in o" iff there is 
an action b such that a causes l by b in tr. We say that a causes l by b in tr iff 
1. be_a; 
2. there is an e-proposition b causes  l i f  c I . . . . .  c n such that each of c I . . . . .  c n 
holds in ~r; and 
3. there is no action c such that b cc  and a causes  1 by c in o-. 
If conditions 1 and 2 but not condition 3 hold then the e-proposition i  clause 2 is 
said to be overruled. 
Now, if, based on this extended notion, Bf(a, o-) and Bf(a, or) are defined 
accordingly (cf. Definition 2.2 but with a being any compound action) and share 
elements then the corresponding transition function • is taken to be undefined for 
the argument (a, or); otherwise, qb(a, tr) = (o-\Bf(a, ~r)) U Bf(a, o'), as before. 
H The following description differs slightly from the definition given in [5], which is circular; we 
assume that ours is what he authors actually intended. 
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Example 4.1 (continued). The transition function determined by the e-propositions 
in our domain description D3, viz. (4.1), is defined as follows. Let or be an arbitrary 
state then 
• 
• ({run_into}, tr) = tr, if open E tr 
• ({run_into), tr) = fro {hurt}, if open q~ tr 
• ({pull}, ~) = tr \  {open} 
0(  { activate}, o" ) = tr \  { steeps} 
• ( { activate, pull}, ~r ) = or\ { sleeps, open} 
• ({run_into,pull}, o-) = , ' \{open},  if open e tr 
• ({run_into,pull}, or) = trU {hurt}, if open ~ or 
• ({activate, run_into}, ~) = (. ' \{s leeps}) U {open} 
• ({ activate, run_into, pull}, or ) is undefined. 
Function value * (a ,  or) being undefined for a = {activate, run_into, pull} and each 
state or is due to Bf(a, tr ) n Bf(a, or) = {open}. 
Now, following an appropriate adaptation of Definition 2.3 to domain descrip- 
tions in aec, D 3 admits four models, each of which satisfies 1/o3 = { in i t ia l l y  
sleeps}, viz. 
( { sleeps}, * ) ( { open, sleeps }, * )  
( { sleeps, hurt }, * )  ( { open, sleeps, hurt }, * ) .  
(4.2) 
If, for instance, the v-proposition hurt af ter  {run_into} is added to D 3 then the 
only remaining model is ({open, sleeps}, * )  since for all other structures in (4.2) we 
find that hurt e *({run_into}, tr0). Hence, for example, the v-proposition in i -  
t ia l l y  open is entailed by this extended omain. 
Note that our example domain can be modeled only by allowing both for 
addition and for removal of elements to and from Bf or B r (cf. Section 4.1): 
Example 4.1 (continued). Let or be some state in our example domain. The 
e-proposition {activate, run_into} causes  open adds fluent name open to the set 
Bf({acticate, run_into}, o" ),12 while the e-proposition {activate, run_into} causes  
hurt i f hurt removes fluent name hurt from By({activate, run_into}, tr ) by overrul- 
ing the e-proposition {run_into} causes  hurt i f  open. 
4.3. Implicit Indeterminism: Interpreting Contradictions 
After having introduced our basic concept for (explicitly) representing indetermin- 
ism in Section 3 and after having adopted an adequate formalism for representing 
concurrent actions, we are now able to discuss and propose a solution to the 
12 Note that fluent name open is not mentioned by either of the 'unit' action descriptions {activate} 
causes  sleeps and {run_into} causes  hurt i f open. 
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problem of contradictory specifications of dynamic systems. Suppose the effects are 
not defined explicitly for all possible compound actions. In this case, as argued 
above, it may happen that certain actions are claimed to have contradictory effects. 
From the point of view underlying ~¢c, this indicates that these actions are not 
executable in the world. A typical example employed to justify this way of 
interpreting contradictions i the following: The door is open after it has been 
opened, and the door is not open after it has been closed; since a door cannot be 
open and not open at the same time, it is impossible to simultaneously open and 
close the door. An implicit assumption of this argument is that e-propositions do 
not describe concrete actions but assign (action-) names to the achievement of 
effects: "to open" means to do something that results in the door being open, 
likewise "to close" means to do something that results in the door being closed. 
Then, of course, it is impossible to have both simultaneously. 
In contrast, our idea is that e-proposition describe concrete actions, and that all 
actions (that is, in the end, the mere decision to execute an action) can in principle 
be performed concurrently in any situation, sometimes, maybe, without being 
successful in achieving the intended effect. From this point of view, the occurrence 
of actions which are proposed to have contradictory effects when executed simulta- 
neously only indicates that the descriptions of their effects are incorrect. As argued 
in the introduction, in many applications it is not desirable that an intelligent agent 
stops reasoning as soon as he/she detects an error in the description of the 
scenario he/she is acting in (which happens when the agent uses the semantics of 
~¢'c and observes a compound act ion--or  is asked about the effects of it--which is 
defined to be impossible in the semantics). 
To illustrate this, recall our example domain description D 3. The e-propositions 
describing the effects of the elements of {activate, pull, run_into} claim both open 
and open. In such cases, depending on the chosen interpretation and the extent of 
certainty required, one has to regard as unreliable 
1. the whole domain description (as in State-Event Logic [14]), 
2. the whole situation, 
3. all effects of the conflicting actions, or 
4. the contradictory effects of the conflicting actions. 
It is the latter, weakest condition which we propose in this paper. This follows the 
idea of still believing in every part of the information which does not cause the 
contradiction. 
Example 4.1 (continued). It is of course conceivable that the door opener is 
activated, the door is pulled, and somebody runs into it at the same moment. The 
domain description D 3 proposes both open and open to be an effect of the 
corresponding compound action, viz. {activate, pull, run_into}. Hence, D 3 is incom- 
plete with respect o the world it describes. In fact, without further information we 
cannot say whether the door will be closed after executing this action. However, it 
is reasonable to assume the dog will not sleep afterwards ince we know that 
{activate} causes  sleeps and there is no proposition contradicting this. Using the 
semantics of ~e" c it cannot be inferred that sleeps af ter  {activate, pull, run_into} 
since no successor state ~({activate, pull, run into}, tr) exists (for any state o-). 
In general, whenever a local inconsistency occurs, this causes the entire set of 
simultaneously executed actions to be contradictory. As an extreme case, imagine 
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an agent in Germany switching off a light and, concurrently, two agents in China 
executing the above action. Again, by d c it cannot be inferred that the light is 
switched off in Germany because the description used proposes contradictory 
states of a door somewhere in China. Yet it seems rational to draw as many 
conclusions as reasonably possible about the resulting state instead of declaring it 
to be totally undefined. Preventing lobal inconsistency in case of local conflicts is 
our underlying intention here. 
We therefore weaken the basic assumption which says that qb(a, tr) is undefined 
whenever the corresponding sets By(a, o') and Bf(a,  o') share one or more ele- 
ments, and instead we adopt the concept of nondeterminism developed in the 
preceding section. Informally speaking, if there are conflicts, that is, if the corre- 
sponding intersection Bf(a,  o ' )n  Bf(a,  tr) is not empty, then each combination of 
truth values of the controversial fluent names determines a possible successor 
state. 
The following definition of the language dNC c makes these ideas manifest. 
Syntactically, domain descriptions in our new language are specified using a 
combination of ~¢N and 5gc; that is, we take the syntax of ~¢N and extend it by 
allowing to formalize compound actions. With the next definitions, we provide a 
formal concept of transition determined by a set of e-propositions following the 
above proposal. To ease readability, the overall definition is split into three parts: 
Definition 4.1. Let D be a domain description in sdNC c, and let a cA  D be some 
action and tr _c F D some state. Furthermore, for each b _c a let 
lift= {b alternatively causesE if C EE  D] (4.3) 
each fluent literal in C holds in or } 
be the set of all alternative -propositions in E D for action b and which are 
applicable in or. Let then b 1 . . . . .  bm be a (possibly empty) ordered sequence of 
all actions b i c a which satisfy II ~ 4= { }. A selection for a wrt. or, written A~, is a 
- -  b i 
sequence of alternative -propositions hb,,... ,  hbm such that hb, ~ II ~b, for each 
l < i  <m.  
In words, a selection for an action a consists in exactly one applicable alternative 
e-proposition hb, provided there exists any, for each sub-action b __ a. 
Definition 4.2. Let D be a domain description, and let a cA  D be some action, 
tr c_ F D some state, and e ~ F D U { f [ f  ~ F D} some fluent literal. Furthermore, let 
A~ = Ab, . . . . .  hb, ~ be a selection for a wrt. o-. Then we say that a causes e wrt. A~ 
in ~ if there is an action b cA  D such that a causes e by b (wrt. A~ in ~r). We 
say that a causes e by b wrt. A~ in or iff 
1. bc_a; 
2. at least one of these two conditions is satisfied: 
(a) E D contains a strict e-proposition b causes  e i f  c I . . . . .  c n such that 
each of c 1 . . . . .  Cn holds in or, or 
(b) I I~{} and e occurs in E, where h b =b a l te rnat ive ly  causes  E 
i f  C ~ H;  is selected via A]; and 
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3. there is no action c such that b c c and a causes ~ by c wrt. A~ in or. We 
then define 
By(a,A~, o-) := {f~FDla causes f wrt. A~ in o-} 
( a, At,  o-) := {f  ~ FDIa causes f wrt. A] in or }. 
In words, a fluent literal is caused if it is among the strict or selected alternative 
effects, provided the corresponding e-proposition is not overruled. 
Definition 4.3. Let D be a domain description in ~¢NCC, and let q~ ___ 2 FD x 2 ~o x 2 F° 
be a relation. Then • is a transition relation for D if for each two states 
tr, tr' c_F o and each action a cA  o we have (o-,a, o-') ~ q~ iff the following 
holds: There exists_ a selection A~ for a wrt. cr and a set B/(a,A~a, tr)c_ 
By(a, A~, or) n By(a, A~, o') such that 
o-' = (o - \~(a ,A~,  ~) )U  (By(a,  a ] ,  o - ) \B f i  (a ,a ] ,  o,)).  (4.4) 
To summarize, a possible successor state is obtained by first making a random 
selection among the applicable alternative e-propositions, separately for each 
compound action b_  a. Afterwards, we proceed as in ~'c except in case conflicts 
occur, where we take any truth value distribution__ B/ (a ,A~,  or) among the dis- 
puted fluent names, i.e., By(a, A~, or) n By(a, A~, tr), when computing a possible 
o-' via (4.4). 
Based on this concept of transition, the notion of model and entailment in ~¢NCC 
are adopted from our language ~¢U (cf. Definition 3.3): 
Definition 4.4. Let D be a domain description in ~NCC" A structure is a triple 
(o-0,~, ~p) where o- 0 c_Fo, • C_2 F° >( 2 A° X 2 F° and q~: (2Ao)  * ~ 2 F° such that 13 
1. ~p([ ]) = tr 0 and 
2. (qff[al,...,an]),an+ 1,q~([a 1. . . . .  an,an+l])) ~ ~ for each sequence of actions 
a t . . . . .  an,a,+ 1 (n>O).  
A v-proposition l a f te r  [a 1 . . . . .  a n] (n > 0) is true in a structure (tr 0, qb, q~) iff l 
holds in qff[a I. . . . .  an]). The structure is a model of D iff • is a transition 
relation for D and all v-propositions in V o are true. A v-proposition ~ is entailed 
by D iff u is true in every model of D. 
Example 4.1 (continued). If our domain description D 3 is augmented by either the 
v-proposition open a f t e r {activate, pull, run_into} or the opposite proposition open 
af ter  {activate, pull, run_into} then both extended domains have models (with 
different functions tp) according to the semantics of ~ucc. On the other hand, if 
D 3 is augmented by sleeps af ter  {activate, pull, run_into} then there is no model 
wrt. SdNc . Consequently, we can conclude, as intended, that our domain entails 
sleeps af ter  {activate, pull, run_into}. 
The reader might have noticed that egNC c does not distinguish between inten- 
tionally expressed nondeterminism of actions and our interpretation of inconsis- 
13The set (2A°) * contains all finite lists whose lements are finite, non-empty subsets of A o. 
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tently specified actions. For instance, D 3 could be augmented by the e-propositions 
{activate} causes  bark and {activate} causes  bark for describing that the dog 
possibly starts or stops barking when the door opener is activated. The two 
alternative -propositions {activate} a l te rnat ive ly  causes  bark and {activate} 
al ternat ive ly  causes bark together serve the identical purpose. In fact, for 
someone reasoning about a domain description it makes no difference whether the 
designer of this domain description was aware of the uncertainty of the described 
effects or not. 
5. TRANSLATING dscc  INTO ~-~'Ncc 
In the second part of this paper, we show how domain descriptions and the notions 
of transition and entailment in our new language 5~'NC c may be encoded as logic 
programs. While in the preceding sections the sets of elements underlying a 
domain description were of arbitrary, possibly infinite size, we need to restrict 
ourselves to finite sets of fluent names, unit actions, and e- and v-propositions in
order to obtain a finite logic program. The approach we follow here is based on the 
reification of whole state descriptions by treating them as single terms [17]. To this 
end, each fluent that holds in a state is formally represented by a term (a so-called 
fluent term), and to constitute a state representation these fluent terms are 
connected by a special binary function symbol, denoted o. For instance, the term 
(open o sleeps)° hurt describes the state wrt. Example 4.1 where the door is open, 
the dog is sleeping, and the protagonist has hurt himself. Intuitively, the order in 
which the various fluent terms are connected is irrelevant as regards the state to be 
represented. Hence our connection function has some special properties, which are 
formalized using the following equational theory [17]: 
VX,  Y, Z.(  X o y )  o Z = X o ( y o Z)  (associativity) 
VX, Y. X o Y = Y o X (commutativity) 
VX. X oQ =X (unit element), 
where the constant ~ denotes a unit element for o, which corresponds to an empty 
collection of fluent terms. These three axioms (AC1, for short) are used as the 
underlying equational theory for our logic program} 4 Therefore, the special 
function symbol o will be referred to as the ACl-function, and a term consisting of 
subterms that are connected by this function will be referred to as an ACl-term. In 
what follows, we use the equality predicate " =nc~ " in program clauses to illustrate 
that equality should always be related to the axioms above. Due to the law of 
associativity, we can omit parenthesis on the level of o in any ACl-term. 
On the basis of representing a state by a collection of fluent terms, the 
execution of actions is modeled through manipulation of such collections. For this 
reason the underlying approach is named fluent calculus. Aside from being closely 
related, in its basic form, to the Linear Connection Method [6] and reasoning 
about actions based on Linear Logic [13, 27], the fluent calculus has recently been 
shown to successfully deal both with the ramification [41] as well as with the 
qualification problem [38, 40], and with reasoning about continuous change [16]. 
14 While it suffices to consider these axioms in view of a suitable resolution procedure (see Section 
5.4), the standard axioms of equality plus axioms allowing to derive inequalities are additionally 
required when discussing an adequate semantics for our program (see Section 5.2). 
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In the following subsection, 5.1, we describe how to construct a fluent calculus- 
based logic program corresponding to a domain description in SgNc . In Section 
5.2, we discuss the semantics of the resulting program by applying the standard 
completion procedure [9] augmented by a special treatment of the underlying 
equational theory [19, 34]. In Section 5.3, we then prove soundness and complete- 
ness of the equational logic program (by taking the extended completion seman- 
tics) wrt. the semantics of ~NCC" Finally, in Section 5.4 we discuss the applicability 
of a special resolution variant, namely, SLDENF-resolution [34, 39], to our logic 
program. We assume that the reader be familiar with the basic concepts of normal 
logic programs (i.e., logic programs augmented by negation-as-failure) as described, 
e.g, in the textbook [25]. We use a PROLOG-like syntax in denoting constants and 
predicates by lower case letters and variables by upper case letters. Moreover, free 
variables are assumed to be universally quantified and, as usual, the term [hit] 
denotes a list with head h and tail t. 
5.1. The Equational Logic Program 
Let D be a domain description in ~¢NCC based on fluent names F o. For a proper 
representation of negative fluent literals, we introduce a unary function whose 
application to a term representing a fluent name indicates the negation of the 
latter. We will denote this function illustratively by a bar on top of its argument, 
like negation has been denoted in the action description languages. Formally, we 
employ a function r mapping sequences of fluent literals to ACl-terms as follows: 
r ( l l , . . . , ln  ) :=11 . . . . .  In , 
where l i ~= F o U { f [ f~  F o} (1 _< i _< n), and in case n = 0 the function value of r is 
the unit element 0 of o. 
A state ~r = {fl . . . .  ,fro} over a fixed set of fluent names F o ~_ {fl . . . . .  fro} is 
represented by an ACl-term as follows: 
YD({fl . . . . .  f~}) :=fl  . . . . .  fm °fro +1 . . . . .  fn, (5.1) 
where {fl . . . . .  f~} = FD. 
Finally, we also employ our ACl-function to represent compound actions, viz. by 
simply connecting the unit action names, which, too, are taken as terms to that 
end: 
/3.({a I . . . . .  ak}) := al . . . . .  ak ' (5.2) 
where {al, . . . ,  a J  cA o. 
We are now prepared for translating domain descriptions D in S~NC c into a set 
of logic program clauses. To begin with, we introduce, for each fluent name f ~ F o, 
a separate unit clause to relate f to its counterpart f:
FLUENT D := {complement( r( f , f ) ).1 f ~ FD}. (5.3) 
Let E D be a given set of e-propositions. Then for each strict e-proposition we 
use an instance of the ternary predicate prop stating the action name, the effect, 
and the conditions: 
EPROP D := {eprop( Ix( a), r(  l), r( c, . . . . .  c,)).[ 
a causes  l i f C 1 . . . .  , Cn ~ ED}. (5.4) 
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Analogously, alternative -propositions describing possible effects of nondetermin- 
istic actions are encoded using the ternary predicate alteprop: 
AL TEPROP o 
:= {alteprop( Ix( a), "r(e 1 . . . . .  era), ~-( c I . . . . .  cn)).l (5.5) 
a a l te rnat ive ly  causese l , . . . ,e  m if Cl,...,c n EED}.  
Example 5.1. Let D 4 denote the amalgamation of the two domains described in 
Example 3.1 and Example 4.1, respectively. We then have, say, ro4(sleeps, open)= 
sleeps o open, YDn({alive, sleeps, open}) = alive o sleeps o open o l-oa-d-d-~o 
n ~  oh--~, and IxD,({activate, run_into}) = activate o run_into. The program 
clauses FLUENTo4 0 EPROPo, U ALTEPROPo, are as follows: 
complement (loaded o loaded). 
complement (alive o a~tve ).
complement (nervous o nervous). 
complement (sleeps o sleeps). 
complement (hurt o hurt). 
complement ( open o open). 
eprop( load, loaded, (g) . 
eprop( shoot ,loaded, 0 ) .  
eprop( shoot ,alive, loaded). 
alteprop( spin, loaded, 0 ) .  
aheprop (spin, loaded o nervous, 0) .  
eprop (activate, sleeps, 0) .  
eprop (run_ into, hurt, open ). 
eprop( pull, op--~, Q). 
eprop( activate o run_into, open, Q) . 
eprop( activate o run_into,-h---u-r~,-hu-~). 
In order to encode the general concept of transition underlying ~¢ucc, we use a 
ternary predicate action(i, a, h) stating that executing action a in state i possibly 
yields state h. Following Definitions 4.1-4.3, a possible successor state is obtained 
by taking into account all applicable, strict e-propositions and a selection consisting 
of exactly one element of each set of applicable alternative -propositions describ- 
ing an identical subset of a. This is reflected in the following definition of the 
action predicate: 
action( I, A,  H)  *-- selection( A,  S, I ) ,  
impossible( H, I, A,  S ) , 
unfounded( H, I, A ,  S), (5.6) 
inconsistent(H). 
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The intended meaning of this clause is the following: Let i be a term represent ing 
a state [cf. (5.1)] and a be a term represent ing a (compound)  act ion [cf. (5.2)], 15 
then: 
1. Let s be a term of the form (b 1, el, c 1) . . . . .  (bin, era, c m) where each subterm 
(bj, ei, cj) (1 < j  < m) is a tr iple represent ing an alternative -proposi t ion bi 
a l te rnat ive ly  causes  ej if cj. An instance selection(a,s,i) is then 
intended to be true if s represents a selection for a wrt. state i (cf. Def init ion 
4.1). To this end, we introduce the fol lowing program clause: 
selection( A,  S, I )  ,-- -7 overrepresented( A,  S, I ) ,  
underrepresented( A,  S, I ) . (5.7) 
In words, the middle argument  of  selection contains a representat ion of not 
more  than and also at least one e lement  of each set of appl icable alternative 
e-proposit ions.  The predicates overrepresented and underrepresented are de- 
f ined as follows: 
overrepresented( A,  X o R, I )  ~ X CAC1Q~, 
underrepresented( A,  R, I ) .  
underrepresented( A oB, S, C o j )  ~ alteprop( A,  E, C ) , 
represented(A, S) .  (5.8) 
represented( A,  ( A,  E, C )o R ) . 
In words, underrepresented(a o b, s, i) is true if there exists an appl icable (wrt. 
state i)16 alternative -proposi t ion for sub-act ion a but s does not include a 
tr iple represent ing an alternative for this part icular  ac t ion - -and  overrepre- 
sented(a, s, i) is true if s contains more  than these triples. 
2. An  instance impossible(h, i, a, s) is intended to be true if h, which is intended 
to represent  a possible successor state of i wrt. action a, contains a fluent 
l iteral whose negat ion (but not the l iteral itself) is c laimed by some non-over-  
ruled e-proposi t ion (either a strict one, or  an alternative one that has been 
selected via s)} v Accordingly,  the definit ion of impossible is the following: 
impossible( F o H, I, A,  S) ¢--- overruled( F, I, 0 ,  A ,  S) ,  
complement( F o G),  (5.9) 
overruled(G, I, f~, A,  S ) . 
An instance overruled(h, i  b, a, s) is intended to be true if h contains a fluent 
l iteral whose negat ion is c la imed by a (strict or selected) e-proposi t ion for 
some action c such that c m b and c ~ a. The clauses defining overruled 
follow Definit ion 4.3: 
overruled( F o H, C o J, A,  A o B o D, S) 
• - eprop( A o B, G, C) ,  (5.10) 
B =//:AC1 ~,  
15 For the sake of readability, in the following description we sometimes identify a term t which 
represents a state (or a sequence of fluent literals or a compound action, respectively) with the state 
1 1 1 3'o (t) itself (or with v- (t) or/~- (t), respectively). 
~6Note that applicability means the conditions c of the e-proposition are true in i, which is 
guaranteed if the terms c o j and i are unifiable under the AC1 theory (see Lemma 5.1, below). 
17Notice that in case both a fluent literal and its negation are claimed to be true by two or more 
non-overruled e-propositions (strict or selected), either of them may hold in a resulting state. This 
encodes our way of solving conflicts, as formalized in Definition 4.3. 
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. 
complement( F o G),  
overruled(G, C o J, A o B,  A o B o D, S ) .  
overruled(Fo H,  C o J ,A ,Ao  B o D , (  Ao  B ,Go  E ,C)°  R)  
B #AC1Q, 
complement( F o G ) , 
-7 overruled( G ,C  o J, A o B,  A o B o D, ( A o B ,G  o E ,C)  o R) .  
In words, the particular effect F of an action A is overruled by an eprop (first 
clause) or an alteprop that has been selected (second clause) postulating the 
effect G = F of an action A o B DA if this e-proposition is not overruled 
itself. 
An instance unfounded(h, i, a, s) is intended to be true if h contains a fluent 
literal whose negation holds in i but there is no (strict or selected via s) 
e-proposition for action a wrt. state i that induces this change. The definition 
of this predicate is as follows: 
unfounded( F o H,  G o I, A ,  S)  ~ complement( F o G) ,  
~overruled( G ,Go  I, Q ,A ,S ) .  (5.11) 
In words, a change from fluent literal G = P to F is unfounded if there is no 
(strict or selected) e-proposition that overrules the assumption that G contin- 
ues to be true. 
An instance inconsistent(h) is intended to be true if ACl - term h does not 
represent a state [cf. (5.1)], that is, if h contains some fluent term twice or 
more, or it contains a fluent name along with its negation, or there is some 
fluent name f ~ FD such that neither f nor f occur as subterm. These three 
criteria are encoded by the following clauses: 
inconsistent( G o G o H)  
inconsistent( F o G)  
inconsistent(H) 
holds( F,  H o F ) . 
~- G #aClO. 
complement (F ) .  
complement( F o G ) , 
F 4%ClO, G 4%ClO, 
holds(F ,  H ) , ~ holds(G,  H ) . 
(5.12) 
Having encoded the transition relation, we now show how to model the applica- 
tion of an action sequence [al . . . . .  am] to some initial state. Since the resulting 
state is model-dependent and, in particular, determined by the associated function 
q~ (cf. Definition 4.4), we need to find a way to encode the latter within the model 
generation process. To this end, we first introduce the notion of an action tree 
serving as a (minimal)  basis for the set of v-propositions underlying the domain 
description at hand: 
Definition 5.1. Let D be a domain description in SCNC c with action names A D and 
v-propositions V D. An  action tree is a tree 23 whose nodes are finite lists over 
2 A~ such that 
1. the root of 23 is [], and 
2. if [a i , . . . ,am,am+ 1] is a node in 
(m > 0). 
23 then its predecessor is [a 1 . . . . .  a m] 




[{spin}, { shoot-at-pievre } ] [ { spin}, { shoot-at-vase I ] 
[] 
Ix1 
(b) [({spin}, Xl)] 
X2 X~ 
[ ( { spin } , X1), ( { shoot-at-pierre } ,X2)] [ ( { spin I, X1), ({shoot-at-vase}, Xa)] 
FIGURE 2. (a) An action tree describing two directions of development, which forms a 
minimal basis for domains with v-propositions {(3.7), (3.8)}, and (b) the same tree augmented 
by variables to record the outcomes in a concrete model. 
An action tree 2~ is called basis for D iff for each v-proposition l a f te r  
[a  1 . . . . .  a m ] in VD the sequence [a 1 . . . . .  a m] is a node in 23. Moreover, the 
minimal  basis for D is the basis with a minimal number of nodes. 
As an example, suppose given the v-propositions {(3.7),(3.8)}, then Figure 2(a) 
depicts the minimal basis for the corresponding domain. Notice that for any finite 
set of v-propositions a unique minimal basis exists and is finite. 
The purpose of a minimal basis is to indicate which arguments of the model 
component q~ are of interest--regarding the underlying v-proposit ions--when 
searching for models. Now, to record the actual values of q~ in a particular model, 
we assign variables, which are intended to be substituted by states, to the edges of 
the basis as follows. Let 23 D be the minimal basis for D containing /3 + 1 nodes 
(/3 >__ 0). Furthermore, let X 1 . . . . .  X~ be pairwise different variables assigned 
one-to-one to the edges of the tree, then each node [a I . . . . .  am,am+ 1] in 23 D 
(m >__ 0) is replaced by the sequence of pairs [(al, X~) . . . . .  (am, X~), (am + 1, X/)] 
where 
1. the predecessor is replaced by [(a 1, X~) . . . . .  (am,  X~)], and 
2. the edge from the predecessor to the node itself is labeled with X i. 
A possible labeling of our example tree is depicted in Figure 2(b). 
In order to encode in our logic program the notion of models for domain 
descriptions in ~gNCC, we first introduce the ternary predicate result. Its intended 
meaning is that result(yo(~ro),[(Ix(a1), h 1) . . . . .  (//,(am), hm)]  ' yD(M l ........ ~1)) is true 
iff the application of [a I . . . . .  a m ] to initial state ~r 0 yields the state M t ......... 1 in a 
model which satisfies q~([a 1 . . . . .  ai]) = yDl (h i )  for each 1 < i _< m. It is required that 
each h i represent a possible successor state of applying a i to the preceding state, 
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according to the underlying transition relation. The clauses defining result thus are 
as follows: 
result(l, [ ], I ) .  
result(I, [(A, H)l e], G) ,-- action( I, A, H ), (5.13) 
result( H, P, G ) . 
In words, M IJ is ~r 0, and in case m > 0, M Ea, ...... ~J is obtained by computing a
successor state H = yDl(hl) of executing a1 in 0% and by applying the remaining 
sequence [a 2 . . . . .  a m] to this state. 
Finally, to encode the v-propositions V D = {l i af ter  [ail . . . . .  aim][1 _< i _< n}, we 
use the following clause defining the predicate model. The construction, of this 
clause is grounded on a given minimal basis 2~ D augmented by variables for the 
domain under consideration: 
model(I, X 1 .... , X~ ) 
*-- ~ inconsistent(1), 
result(l,[( tz(al l ) ,X~.) , . . . , (  #(alm,),X~l)],~'(l l)oG1), (5.14) 
result(I,{( IZ(anl),X~.), . . . ,(  tz(anm.),X~,)],z(ln)°Gn), 
where X 1 . . . . .  XI3 are the variables assigned to ~o and, for each 1 < i < n, the 
variables X,~ i, . . . .  X~, are chosen according to the corresponding node (for the 
action sequence [ail,...,aim fl) in the labeled basis ~D" Hence the intended 
meaning is that model(i, h 1 ... . .  hl3) is true if i represents a consistent initial state 
such that all v-propositions in V D are satisfied under the assumption that h 1 . . . . .  hi3 
are the states resulting from executing the respective action sequence. 
Example 5.1 (continued). Given the four v-propositions 
alive after {{load}] 
alive af ter  {{load}, {spin}, {shoot}] 
i n i t ia l  l y  sleeps (5.15) 
hurt after [{activate, run_into}] 
these are encoded by the following program clause if we take the suitably labeled 
basis shown in Figure 3: 
model(l, X1, X2, )(3, X4) 
~- ~ inconsistent(I), 
result(l, [(load, X1) ] , alive° G1) , 
result(l, [(load, X 1 ), ( spin, X2), ( shoot, X3) ] , alive° G2), (5.16) 
result(l, [ ], sleeps o G3), 
result(I, [(activate o run_into, 1"4) ] ,hurto G4). 
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[] 
XI X4 
[({load}, Xl)] [({ activate, run_into }, X.)] 
Ix2 
[({load}, Xt), ({spin}, X2)] 
Ix3 
[({Zo.d}, Xl), ((.pi-}, x2), ((shoot}, X3)] 
FIGURE 3. A suitable labeled action tree for the v-propositions in (5.15). 
To summarize, a domain description D in ~¢NCC is translated into the set of 
clauses PD = FLUENTD U EPROP o U ALTEPROP D U {(5.6)-(5.14)}• The resulting 
equational ogic program we denote by (PD,AC1), and the class of resulting 
equational logic programs shall be denoted by ~NCC"  The reader might have 
noticed that the major part of this program, clauses (5.6)-(5.13), is domain 
independent and constitutes an intuitive and direct translation of Definitions 
4.1-4.4. 
5.2. The Complet ion  Semant ics  
The equational ogic program developed in the previous subsection contains 
negative literals in the bodies of some clauses. These negative literals are intended 
to be treated by the (nonmonotonic) negation-as-failure principle. An adequate 
semantics for such programs, which is based on classical first-order logic, is 
obtained by applying an extension of Clark's completion procedure [9] to the 
program. The idea is to consider the set of program clauses which define a 
predicate p as a complete description of the positive information regarding p: 
Definition 5.2. Let p(t  1 . . . . .  t n) ~ L~ . . . . .  L m be a program clause, and let Y denote 
a sequence of all variables which occur in this clause. Furthermore, let X 1 . . . . .  Xn 
be pairwise different variables not in Y. Then the rectified form of this clause is 
the formula p(X  1 . . . . .  Xn)~ 3Y(X  1 =t I /k . ' -  / kX  n =t  n AL 1A "'" ALto). le t  p 
be an arbitrary predicate symbol and 
P( Xl  . . . . .  Xn) ~ 01 
p(  X 1 . . . . .  Xn) ~ D~ 
be all clauses in a program P defining p in rectified form (k> 0). The 
completed efinition of p in P is the formula 
VX 1 . . . .  ,Sn(p(  S 1 . . . . .  Sn)  ~--) D 1 V ... V Dk) 
[In case k = 0 this reduces to V( ~p(X 1 . . . . .  X~))]. The completion P* of P is the 
conjunction of the completed efinitions of all predicate symbols occurring in 
the underlying alphabet except for the equality predicate "= " 
Given a domain description D in SCNC c, the entire completion of the correspond- 
ing program clauses PD, written P/~, is shown in the Appendix. 
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Aside from completing the program clauses, a logic program with an underlying 
equational theory requires a special kind of completion for the equality predicate 
since axioms are needed which allow for proving inequalities in order to derive 
negative information. In case of standard completion [9], some axiom schemata re 
added to the completed formula which allow for proving inequality of two terms 
whenever these are not syntactically unifiable. The concept of unification complete- 
ness [19, 34] generalizes these axioms schemata for arbitrary equational theories. 
Prior to stating the formal definition, we need to introduce some notions and 
notation related to unification theory, taken from the survey article [2]. The 




X i = Yo f (X I  . . . . .  X i . . . . .  X , )  =f (X~, . . .  ,Y  . . . . .  X , )  





(substitutivity I I)  
for each n-place function symbol f and predicate p, and for each 1 _< i < n. If E is 
an equational theory then two terms s, t are called E-equal if the formula s = t is a 
logical consequence of E plus the standard equality axioms. Two terms s, t are said 
to be E-unifiable if there exists a substitution 0 such that sO and tO are E-equal; 
in which case 0 is called an E-unifier for s,t. A complete set orE-unifiers cUe(s,t) 
for two terms s, t is a set of E-unifiers for s, t such that each E-unifier for s, t is 
subsumed by at least one element in cUe(s,t). As in [34], given a substitution 
0= {X1 ~ t~ . . . . .  X n ~ tn} we use eqn(O) to denote the formula X 1 =t l  A --- A 
Xn ~tn. 
Definition 5.3. Let E be an equational theory. A consistent set of first-order 
formulas E* is called unification complete wrt. E if it consists of the axioms in 
E, the standard equality axioms, and a number of equational formulas, i.e., 
formulas with "= " as the only predicate, such that for any two terms s and t 
with variables .~ the following holds: 
1. If s and t are not E-unifiable then E* ~ ~ :1~. s = t. 
2. If s and t are E-unifiable then for each complete set of E-unifiers cUE(s, t) 
E*~ VX(s=t  ~ V 3Y.  eqn(o) ) ,  (5.17) 
O~cUE(s,t) 
where Y denotes the variables which occur in eqn(O) but not in .~. 
In [18], we have proved the existence of a unification complete theory ACI*  for 
the equational theory AC1 used in J-~NCC" Since we do not intend to compute 
with ACI*, we are only interested in the properties of this theory as given by 
Definition 5.3; its actual design is irrelevant for our analysis. Given a domain 
description D in ~¢NCC, we take the formulas P~ u ACI* as the logic programming 
semantics for the corresponding program (Po,AC1). 
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5.3. Soundness  and Completeness  o f  the Translation 
Based on the completion semantics, we now prove soundness and completeness of
our equational logic program wrt. the entailment relation defined for SgNC c. We 
start with a number of lemmas concerning specific parts of our program. 
Lemma 5.1. Let D be a domain description in ~NCC with fluent names F D. Further- 
more, let c 1 . . . . .  c m be a sequence of  fluent literals (m > O) and Dr c F D be a state. 
Then each of  c I . . . . .  c ,, holds in cr iff "c( c I . . . . .  c m ) o V and To(Dr) are A C l-unifia- 
ble (where V is an arbitrary variable). 
Analogously, let A D be the underlying set o f  unit actions and a, b cA  D two 
actions then b c a iff Ix(b) o V and Ix(a) are ACl-unifiable. 
PROOF. In case m = 0, Q o V and YD(Dr) are always ACl-unifiable using the 
substitution {V~ yD(~r)}. Otherwise, associativity and commutativity of o imply 
that the two terms are ACl-unifiable iff each subterm ~-(c~) occurs in yD(~), the 
latter of which contains exactly the fluent literals that hold in or. The second claim 
follows analogously. [] 
Notice that moreover unification completeness of ACI* ensures 
ACI*  ~ VV.'r(  c I . . . .  , Cm)O V-'-'-~ "~D( Dr ) 
whenever some c i (1 < i < m) does not hold in o" (cf. clause 1 in Definition 5.3). 
In what follows, a notation like (5.3*) refers to the completed efinition(s), listed 
in the appendix, of the clause(s) in (5.3). 
Lemma 5.2. Let D be a domain description in SCNC c. Furthermore, let o" c F D be a 
state and a cA  o an action. I f  b' 1 . . . . .  b', are actions and e' 1 . . . . .  e'n and c' 1 . . . . .  c'~ 
both are sequences of  fluent literals (n >__ O) then 
P~ U AC I*  
selection(Ix(a),  ( Ix(b' l ) ,  "r ( e'l ) , ~" ( c '1) ) . . . . .  ( I x (b ; ) ,  r ( e '~ ) , "c ( c'n ) ) , 3%( Dr )) 
iff the following holds: 
For each b ca  let II~ be the set of  all alternative -propositions in E D for action 
b whose conditions hold in Dr. Then there exists a selection A~ = Abl . . . .  , hb~ for a 
wrt. o" such that m = n and such that there is a one-to-one correspondence b tween 
the triples (Ix(b'l), z(e'l), r(C'l)),... ,(Ix(b'n), z(e'n), z(c',)) and the elements o f  A] 
- -where (Ix(b~), T(e ' i )  , T(c'i)) corresponding to hb, = bj a l te rnat ive ly  causes  
E i f C means that b I = bj, e' i = E, and c' i = C. 
Pgoov. Let s = ( Ix(b 0, r(e'l), ~(c'1)) . . . . .  (tz(b,), T(e'n), z(c',)). From (5.8*) and 
(5.5*) in conjunction with Lemma 5.1 it follows that underrepresented(Ix(a), s, To(i)) 
is entailed iff there exists some b _c a such that I I~ 4= { } but no subterm (Ix(b), t 1, t 2) 
occurs in s. Accordingly, following (5.8"), overrepresented(Ix(a), s, To(i)) is entailed 
iff s includes any other subterms aside from exactly one subterm of the form 
(Ix(b), tl, t 2) for each b __ a with IIff 4: { }. Thus, for each (Ix(b'i), ~'(e'i), T(C'i)) in s 
we can find some bj ~ {b 1 . . . . .  b m} and, hence, some h. b in A~ such that b~ = b, - -and J J 
vice versa. Moreover, (5.8*) in conjunction with (5.5*) ensures that e' i = E and 
c' i = C. The claim then follows from (5.7*) ~ P~. [] 
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The following lemma describes the connection between the program clauses 
defining the predicate overruled and Definition 4.2: 
Lemma 5.3. Let D be a domain description in ~'ucc. Furthermore, let e I . . . . .  e n be a 
sequence of  f luent literals (n > 1), or a state, a, b actions such that b c_ a, and s a 
term representing a selection A~ for a wrt. or. Then 
P~9 U AC I*  ~ -1 overruled(r( e 1 . . . . .  e , ) ,  TD( or ), b, a, s) (5.18) 
iff there is no e i (1 < i < n) such that a causes ~i by some c wrt. A~ such that c D b 
and c c a. 
PROOF. From b _c a we know Ibl _< lal. The proof  is by induction on m = ]al - Ibl. In 
case m = 0 (that is, a = b), no such c can possibly exist. Correspondingly, the literal 
B 4:AClQ in both disjuncts of (5.10") guarantees (5.18) to hold. 
In case m > 0, f rom (5.10") in conjunction with (5.3*) and (5.4*) and l_emma 5.1 
we know that 
e~ t3 ACI*  ~ overruled('c( e 1 . . . . .  en), TD( or ), b, a, s) (5.19) 
iff some e i (1 ~< i < n) and some action c (with b c c ___ a) exist such that clause 2 of 
Definition 4.2 holds for fluent literal ~ and such that 
P~ u AC I*  ~ -7 overruled(z(~),  YD( 0- ), C, a, s) (5.20) 
Since Ibl < Icl _< lal, we have 0 < lal - Icl < m. Hence the induction hypothesis is 
applicable and ensures (5.20) be true iff a does not cause e//by some c'  wrt. A~ 
such that c cc '  ___a. Thus, according to Definition 4.2, we know that (5.19) is true 
iff a causes some e~ by some c wrt. A~ such that c D b. Hence the latter (i.e., a 
causing some ~/) being false is equivalent o (5.18) being true. [] 
Finally, we prove the correctness of our definition of consistency as regards 
AC l - te rms that are intended to represent states: 
Lemma 5.4. Let D be a domain description with fluents F D and i an ACl - term then 
P~ u ACI*  ~ -~ inconsistent(i) 
iff for each fluent name f ~ FD, 
1. either f or else f occurs in i, and 
2. i does not contain any fluent term more than once. 
PROOF. In conjunction with Lemma 5.1, the first disjunct in (5.12") ensures that no 
fluent term occurs twice or more  in i, the second disjunct ensures that i does not 
contain a fluent name along with its negation, and the third disjunct ensures that 
each fluent name is represented affirmatively or negatively. [] 
The following theorem concerning transition of states forms the basis of our 
soundness and completeness result: 
Theorem 5.1. Let D be a domain description in ~NCC" I f  • is a transition relation for 
E D then for each state cr c_ FD, action a cA  D, and each term h 
P~ UACI*  ~ action(yD( o'),  tz (a) ,  h)  (5.21) 
iff (~r, a, or ') ~ ~ where h represents state o" '. 
PROOF. F rom Lemma 5.4 and from (5.6*)~ P~ and Lemma 5.2 it follows that 
(5.21) holds iff h represents a state, there exists some term s which represents a
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selection A~ for a wrt. o-, and 
P~ O ACI*  ~ ~ unfounded(h,  3'0( ~r ) , / z (a ) ,  s) 
A ~ impossible(h, TD( O- ) , /x (a ) ,  s) 
holds. Following (5.11"), (5.9*) and Lemma 5.3 this in turn holds iff 
1. for each fluent literal l which is true in o- but false in ~r' there is some 
applicable (strict or selected in s) e-proposit ion postulating ], and 
2. there is no fluent literal l that holds in ~r' such that a causes i in cr but not 
a causes l in o-] s 
According to Definition 4.3, this is equivalent o (o', a, ~r ') ~ cb. [] 
Based on this theorem, we can prove soundness and completeness of our 
equational ogic program wrt. the semantics of ~NCC as given by Definition 4.4. 
More  precisely, we will prove that a v-proposit ion l a f te r  [a I . . . . .  am] is entailed 
iff no model can be found- -accord ing  to (5.14*)--which contradicts this v-proposi- 
tion. To this end, recall Definit ion 5.1, where we have introduced the concept of an 
action tree to encode the model  component  q~. In order to test entai lment of a 
v-proposit ion using the literal result(i, [(al, X 1 ) . . . . .  (a m, Xm)], r ( l )o  G), we have to 
take into account the underlying labeled basis which has been used to construct 
clause (5.14). Let k be maximal in {0 . . . . .  m} such that [a 1 . . . . .  a k] occurs in this 
tree then we use the k variables X ,  . . . . .  X 8 assigned to the actions in this node 
plus pairwise different, new variables X~ . . . .  ,X ' _  k for the tail [ak+ 1 . . . . .  am] of 
the action sequence under consideration. As before, X 1 . . . . .  X~ denotes the entire 
ordered sequence of variables assigned to the underlying basis: 
Theorem 5.2. Let D be a domain description in ~Wuc c. Furthermore, let u = l after 
[a I . . . . .  a m ] be a v-proposition. Then u is entailed by D iff 
P~) O AC I*  ~ ~3I ,  X (mode l (  I ,X  1 . . . . .  X~)  A 
result(I ,  [ ( ix (a1) ,  X , )  . . . . .  ( / z (ak) ,  X~), 
( /z (ak+ 1), X~) . . . . .  ( IX(am),  X 'm-k)] '  
where X = X l , . . . ,  Xt~, X[ . . . . .  X'm - k" 
PROOF. Let ~ be a transition relation for D. From Lemma 5.4, (5.14"), (5.13)* and 
repeated application of Theorem 5.1 it follows that model( i ,h  1 . . . . .  ht~) is entailed 
iff the structure (o- 0, qb, ~p) satisfies every v-proposit ion in D, that is, if it is model  
for D- -where  i represents state o- 0 and h 1 . . . .  ,h  e correspond to ~0 in the 
following sense: For each j ~ {1 . . . . .  /3}, if, in the underlying labeled basis, Xi has 
been assigned to the edge ending in the node [a' 1 . . . . .  a' t] then hj = 
~/o(~0([a'l . . . . .  a)])). The claim then follows from (5.13") and the fact that u is 
entailed iff there is no model (~r0,dO, q~) for D in which i holds in qff[al , . . . ,am]).  
lSNotice again that if a causes both l and 1 then the corresponding fluent name belongs to 
By" (a, ~), that is, either value may be true in cr '. 
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5.4. SLDENF-Resolution 
Our equational logic programs ~NCC are based on a special equational theory, 
viz. AC1, and they also contain negation in the body of some program clauses. In 
the preceding subsection, we have taken the completion of these programs as an 
adequate semantics if negative literals are to be treated by negation-as-failure. An
adequate computation mechanism for programs including equality and (nonmono- 
tonic) negation is SLDENF-resolution, which is based on SLD-resolution (see, e.g. 
[25]) but with the standard unification procedure replaced by an E-unification 
algorithm and negation-as-failure used to treat negative subgoals. A formal intro- 
duction to this resolution principle can be found in [34, 39]. In [34], soundness of 
SLDENF-resolution wrt. the completion semantics (including the use of unification 
complete theories) has been proved for arbitrary equational logic programs with 
negation. That is, if P is a set of normal program clauses, E an equational theory, 
and ,--L I . . . . .  L n a query for which there exists an SLDENF-refutation with 
computed answer substitution 0, then 
P*OE*~V(L IA . . .  ALn)O 
Combining this result with Theorem 5.2 proves that SLDENF-resolution can be 
applied as a sound proof procedure for the entailment relation defined in Jucc. 
As regards completeness of SLDENF-resolution, it is common knowledge that 
completeness cannot be guaranteed even for the special case of programs with 
negation and the empty equational theory [9, 1]. The classical completeness result 
for SLDNF-resolution is restricted to so-called hierarchical and allowed programs 
[9, 1]. In a hierarchical program, any SLDNF-derivation is necessarily finite, and 
the allowedness criterion prevents so-called floundering: Since by definition of 
SLD(E)NF-resolution egative subgoals can be selected only if they are ground, a 
derivation might end up with only non-ground negative subgoals. In such cases, the 
proof procedure does not come to a conclusion. 
In [39], the aforementioned classical result has been lifted to logic programs 
with equational theories. It has been shown that this is possible only in case the 
underlying equational theory E meets two restrictions: It should be finitary (that is, 
for each two terms s and t there exists a finite complete set of E-unifiers) to 
ensure finiteness of derivations in hierarchical programs, and it should also be 
regular (that is, for each equation s = t ~ E the set of variables occurring in s 
equals the set of variables occurring in t) to avoid the problem of floundering in 
allowed programs. See [39] for a more detailed discussion and formal proof. 
The equational theory used in this paper, ACI, is known to be both finitary [35] 
and, obviously, regular. Nonetheless the result presented in [39] cannot be applied 
since the program developed in Section 5.1 is neither hierarchical nor allowed. We 
therefore have to perform a more detailed and specific analysis. 
Although the programs ~O'~NC c are not hierarchical, it can be shown that all 
SLDENF-derivations we are interested in to decide entailment wrt. SCNC c are 
necessarily finite: Since no mutual recursion involving two or more program clauses 
occurs, the only crucial clauses are direct recursive ones, that is, where the 
predicate in the head also occurs in the body. 
There are three clauses of this kind, shown in (5.10) and (5.13), respectively. As 
regards the two definitions of ouerruled in (5.10), it is easy to see that each 
recursive call increases the size (viz. the number of subterms) of the third 
argument, A. Moreover, the body of the first (resp. second) clause can only be 
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satisfied if there exists a strict e-proposition (resp. a selected alternative -proposi- 
tion) for an action which includes A. Since there is only a limited number of such 
propositions in a concrete domain, the recursive calls eventually stop, provided a 
fair selection rule is used. 
Analogously, the number of recursive calls of result, cf. (5.13), is limited by the 
size of the second argument, provided the latter is (partially) instantiated. This is 
indeed the case in both clause (5.14) and the query used to decide entailment of an 
additional v-proposition (cf. Theorem 5.2). 
While it is easy to show finiteness of derivations, we cannot in general prove 
non-floundering. As a matter of fact, whenever we try to decide entailment of a 
v-proposition l a f te r  [a I . . . . .  a m] by creating the clause 
satisfiable ~ model( I, X ) ,  
result( l , [ (  tz (a l ) ,X~ ) . . . . .  ( tZ (am) ,Xm)] ,7 . (~)oG) .  (5.22) 
(see Theorem 5.2) and using the query ~ ~ satisfiable then the derivation floun- 
ders after clause (5.14) has been appl ied--to solve the subgoal model(l ,  X)- -s ince 
inconsistent(l) cannot be selected as I is a variable. Analogously, whenever 
clause (5.13) has been applied such that a subgoal of the form action(l, A,  H)  
occurs then this can only be resolved using clause (5.6). This, however, requires I
and H be fully instantiated if the derivation is not to flounder. 19 Moreover, 
whenever a suitable collection S of alternative -propositions i  to be selected via 
clause (5.7) then this additionally requires S to be instantiated. 
There are two ways of solving this problem. First, one could define an extension 
of the SLDENF-resolution principle that supports a proper treatment of non- 
ground, negative subgoals, such as the concept of constructive negation, which is a 
well-known technique to avoid floundering in case of non-equational logic pro- 
grams [8, 29]. This, however, requires a new formal definition of an extended 
calculus, and then soundness and completeness have to be proved again. 
Here we follow a simpler and more straightforward way. It is possible to rewrite 
some program clauses such that the crucial variables become instantiated early 
enough during the derivation to prevent floundering. To this end, we add a clause 
that provides all possible collections of size I FDI consisting of fluent literals, where 
F o denotes the underlying set of fluent names of domain D: 
sterm( I )  ~ I =ACa H1 . . . . .  HIFDI, 
complement( H a o J1 ), 
complement ( HIF D I ° JIFo I)" 
where H a, Ja , . . . , HIFoI, JIFol are pairwise distinct variables. 
The new predicate sterm can then be used to instantiate the crucial arguments 
in advance. The following clause is a modification of (5.13): 
result( I, [ ], I ) . 
result(l, [( A, H) IP ] ,  G) ,-- sterm( H ), 
action(I, A ,  H ) , 
result( H, P, G ) . 
19The variable A always becomes instantiated when deciding entailment since action sequences in 
v-propositions are fixed. 
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and this clause can be used instead of (5.14): 
model(l ,  X 1 . . . . .  X ,  ) 
sterm( I ), 
-~ inconsistent(I), 
result(I,[(/z(a11), X~I) . . . . .  (/x(alml) ci), 
result( I ,[( /z(anl),  X~. ) . . . . .  (tz(anm.),X~.)],r(l.)oG~). 
Finally, to avoid floundering after clause (5.7) has been applied, by the following 
clause we provide all suitable instances for a variable which represents a selection, 
that is, which contains a collection of triples each of which represents an alterna- 
tive e-proposition: 
eterm( ~). 
eterm( A,  E, C ) o S) ~ aheprop( A,  E, C ) , 
eterm( S ) , 
S ~Ac1(A ,E ,C)  o R. 
Clause (5.7) is then modified as follows: 
selection( A,  S, I)  ~ eterm( S ) , 
-7 overrepresented( A,  S, I ) ,  
-~ underrepresented( A,  S, I ) .  
To summarize, employing the modified equational logic program avoids the 
problem of floundering derivations. Moreover, all derivations which occur when 
deciding entailment of a v-proposition via the query ,-- ~ satisfiable in conjunction 
with the corresponding clause (5.22) are guaranteed to terminate. Hence 
SLDENF-resolution can now be applied as a sound and complete calculus for the 
equational logic program encoding domains pecified in ~¢NCC" In addition, finite- 
ness of derivations hows that we have obtained a decision procedure for entail- 
ment in our high-level action semantics. 
6. SUMMARY 
We have presented formalisms for intentionally specifying actions so as to have 
nondeterministic effects, and for extracting as much as possible consistent and 
reasonable information from contradictory representations of dynamic systems by 
interpreting them so as to be implicitly nondeterministic. Our resulting language 
~Ncc allows the representation f nondeterministic concurrent actions in dynamic 
systems and the resolution of conflicts. 
We have furthermore developed a sound and complete encoding of domain 
specifications in ~Ncc in terms of equational logic programming and, in so doing, 
have provided an instrument for automated reasoning about these domains. 
Generally, the translation of high-level anguages like ~ucc into different ap- 
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proaches designed for reasoning about dynamic systems, actions, and change allows 
to compare the expressiveness and limitations of these approaches in a precise and 
uniform way. As argued in, e.g. [12, 32, 33, 36, 37], doing this is in favorable 
contrast o the traditional way of justifying new approaches with reference to a few 
standard examples uch as the blocksworld or the Yale Shooting scenario and its 
enhancements. To this end, translations of °~ and some of its extensions, for 
instance, into a number of existing action calculi have recently been used for the 
purpose of comparison and to study their range of applicability (see, e.g. [12, 11, 20, 
5, 23, 10, 22]). The extension defined in this paper, ~zvcc,  may therefore be 
employed as a formal, high-level action semantics for action calculi which success- 
fully deal with domains involving explicit and implicit indeterminism as well as 
concurrency. 
Our formalisms are based on the Action Description Language sO. Two recent 
extensions of sO, namely, first-order-fluents [11] and indirect effects [23], are not 
subsumed by our approach. On the other hand, the fluent calculus, which we have 
used here, has already been extended to successfully cope both with non-proposi- 
tional fluents and with the ramification problem [41]. Hence we have good reasons 
to assume that the logic program presented in this paper can be extended to form 
an adequate ncoding of a high-level action semantics including sgNc c and indirect 
effects. 
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APPENDIX A: THE COMPLETED EQUATIONAL LOGIC PROGRAM 
Let D be a domain description in ~'Ncc, and let (Pn, AC1) be the corresponding 
equational logic program. The completion P~ of PD consists of the following 
first-order formulas. 
Let F D be the underlying set of fluent names then 
VX(complement(X) ~ V x=fof) (5.3*) 
f c  F D 
completes FLUENT m 
Let  {a i causes  e i i f  Ci[l <_ i <_ k} be the set of all strict e-propositions in E o 
(k > 0) then 
VA,E,C eprop(A,E,C) ,--, V (A 
i= l  
completes EPROP o. 
e = A 
c = , (c , ) )}  
(5.4*) 
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Let {ai al ternat ive ly  causes E i if Ci[1 <i <_k} be the set of all alterna- 
tive e-propositions in E D (k > O) then 
k 
VA,E ,C  alteprop(A,E,C) +-> V (A = #(ai) A 
i=1 
E = T(E i )  A (5 .5* )  
c = 
completes AL TEPROP D. 
The completion of clause (5.6) and (5.7) is as follows: 
VI, A, H( action(I, A, H) ~ 3S( selection( A, S, I) A 
impossible(H, I, A, S) A 
unfounded( H, I, A, S) A 
7 inconsistent(H) ) ) 
VA , S, I( selection( A, S, I) o ~ overpresented( A, S, I) A 
-~ underrepresented( A, S, I ) ) .  
The three clauses hown in (5.8) are completed by 
VA , I, S( overrepresented( A, S, I) 
]R ,X(  A 
S=XoRA 
underrepresented( A, S, I) ) ) 
VS, X, Y( underrepresented( X, S, Y) 
BA ,B ,C ,E , J (  X=A o B A 
Y=CoJA  
alteprop( A, E, C ) A 
represented(A, S ) ) ) 
VA,S(represented( A ,S )  (-~ 3C, E ,R .S  = (A ,E ,C)  o R). 
The completion of impossible is 
VA , I, S, X ( impossible( X, I, A, S) +-> 
3F, G ,H(X=Fo HA 
overruled(F, I ,~ ,  A, S) A 
complement( F o G) A 
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and the completion of the two clauses for overruled is the formula 
VA,S ,X ,Y ,Z(  overruled( X ,Y ,A ,Z ,S )  
3B ,C ,D ,F ,G ,H , J (  X=F o HA 
V 
3B ,C ,D ,E ,F ,G ,H , J ,R (  
Y=CoJA  
Z=AoBoDA 
eprop( A o B ,G ,C)  A 
B~S@A 
complement( F o G) A 





S=(AoB,GoE,  C)oRA 
B4:@A 
complement( F o G) A 
-1 overruled(G, Co J, A oB, A oBoD, S ) ) ) . 
Completing (5.11) yields 
VA, S, X, Y( unfounded( X, Y, A, S) 
3F ,G ,H , I (X=Fo HA 
y=GolA  
complement( F o G) A 
overruled(G, Go 1,0,  A, S) ) ). 
The four clauses used to express consistency are completed as follows: 
VI( inconsistent(I) ~ 3 G, H( I = G o G o H A G --/: f~) 
V 
3F,G(  I=F  oG A 
complement (F)  ) 
v 
3F, G( complement( F o G) A 
F4=Q~AG~(~A 
holds(F, I )  A -1 holds(G, I ) ) )  




154 S.-E. BORNSCHEUER AND M. THIELSCHER 
11. Dung, P. M., Representing Actions in Logic Programming and its Applications in 
Database Updates, in: D. S. Warren (ed.), Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Logic Programming (ICLP), Budapest, Hungary, MIT Press, pp. 222-238, 1993. 
12. Gelfond, M. and Lifschitz, V., Representing Action and Change by Logic Programs, 
Journal of Logic Programming 17:301-321 (1993). 
13. Girard, J.-Y., Linear Logic, Journal of Theoretical Computer Science 50(1):1-102 (1987). 
14. GroBe, G., Propositional State-Event Logic, in: C. MacNish, D. Peirce, and L. M. 
Peireira (eds.), Proceedings of the European Workshop on Logics in AI (JELIA), York, 
UK, 1994, Springer, Vol. 838, pp. 316-331. 
15. Hanks, S. and McDermott, D., Nonmonotonic Logic and Temporal Projection, Artificial 
Intelligence Journal 33(3):379-412 (1987). 
16. Herrmann, C. S. and Thielscher, M., Reasoning about Continuous Processes. in: B. 
Clancey and D. Weld (eds.), Proceedings of the AAAI National Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, Portland, OR, 1996, MIT Press, pp. 639-644. 
17. H611dobler, S. and Schneeberger, J. A New Deductive Approach to Planning, New 
Generation Computing 8:225-244 (1990). 
18. H611dobler, S. and Thielscher, M., Computing Change and Specificity with Equational 
Logic Programs, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 14(1):99-133 (1995). 
19. Jaffar, J., Lassez, J.-L., and Maher, M. J., A Theory of Complete Logic Programs with 
Equality, Journal of Logic Programming 1(3):211-223 (1984). 
20. Kartha, G. N., Soundness and Completeness Theorems for Three Formalizations of 
Actions, in: R. Bajcsy (ed.), Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence (IJCAD, Chamb6ry, France, 1993, Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 724-729. 
21. Kartha, G. N., Two Counterexamples Related to Baker's Approach to the Frame 
Problem, Artificial Intelligence Journal 69(1/2):379-391 ( 994). 
22. Kartha, G. N., On the Range of Applicability of Baker's Approach to the Frame 
Problem, in: B. Clancey and D. Weld (eds.), Proceedings of the AAAI National Conference 
on Artificial Intelligence, Portland, OR, 1996, MIT Press, pp. 664-669. 
23. Kartha, G. N. and Lifschitz, V., Actions with Indirect Effects, in: J. Doyle, E. Sandewall, 
and P. Torasso (eds.), Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles of 
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR), Bonn, Germany, 1994, Morgan Kauf- 
mann, pp. 341-350. 
24. Lin, F. and Shoham, Y., Concurrent Actions in the Situation Calculus, in: Proceedings of 
the AAAI National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San Jose, CA, 1992, MIT Press, 
pp. 590-595. 
25. Lloyd, J. W., Foundations of Logic Programming, Series Symbolic Computation Springer, 
2nd edition, 1987. 
26. Lukaszewicz, W. and Madalifiska-Bugaj, E., Reasoning about Action and Change Using 
Dijkstra's Semantics for Programming Languages: Preliminary Report, in: C. S. Mellish 
(ed.), Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAD, 
Montreal, Canada, 1995, Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 1950-1955. 
27. Masseron, M., Tollu, C., and Vauzielles, J., Generating Plans in Linear Logic I. Actions 
as Proofs. Journal of Theoretical Computer Science 113:349-370 (1993). 
28. McCarthy, J. and Hayes, P. J., Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of 
Artificial Intelligence, Machine Intelligence 4:463-502 (1969). 
29. Przymusinski, T. C., On Constructive Negation in Logic Programming, in: E. L. Lusk 
and R. A. Overbeek (eds.), Proceedings of the North American Conference on Logic 
Programming (NACLP), Cleveland, OH, 1989. 
30. Reiter, R., The Frame Problem in the Situation Calculus: A Simple Solution (Some- 
times) and a Completeness Result for Goal Regression, in: V. Lifschitz (ed.), Artificial 
Intelligence and Mathematical Theory of Computation, Academic Press, 1991, pp. 359-380. 
31. Richard, P. et al., ,~ Gauche en Sortant de l'Ascenseur, Renn Productions, 1988. 
32. Sandewall, E., The Range of Applicability of Nonmonotonic Logics for the Inertia 
Problem, in: R. Bajcsy (ed.), Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence (IJCAD, Chamb6ry, France, 1993, Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 738-743. 
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT INDETERMINISM 155 
33. Sandewall, E., Features and Fluents. The Representation f Knowledge about Dynamical 
Systems, Oxford University Press, 1994. 
34. Shepherdson, J. C., SLDNF-Resolution with Equality, Journal of Automated Reasoning 
8:297-306 (1992). 
35. Stickel, M. E., A Complete Unification Algorithm for Associative-Commutative Func- 
tions, in: Proceedings ofthe International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAD, 
Tbilisi, USSR, 1975, pp. 71-76. 
36. Thielscher, M., An Analysis of Systematic Approaches to Reasoning about Actions and 
Change, in: P. Jorrand and V. Sgurev (eds.), International Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence: Methodology, Systems, Applications (AIMSA), Sofia, Bulgaria, 1994, World 
Scientific, pp. 195-204. 
37. Thielscher, M., The Logic of Dynamic Systems, in: C. S. Mellish (ed.), Proceedings ofthe 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAD, Montreal, Canada, 1995, 
Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 1956-1962. 
38. Thielscher, M., Causality and the Qualification Problem, in: L. C. Aiello, J. Doyle, and 
S. Shapiro (eds.), Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles of Knowledge 
Representation a d Reasoning (KR), Cambridge, MA, 1996, Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 
51-62. 
39. Thielscher, M., On the Completeness of SLDENF-Resolution, Journal of Automated 
Reasoning, 17(2):199-214 (1996). 
40. Thielscher, M., Qualification and Causality, Technical Report TR-96-026, International 
Computer Science Institute (ICSI), Berkeley, CA, 1996. 
41. Thielscher, M., Ramification and Causality, Artificial Intelligence Journal (1997), to 
appear. 
